the law is known, accepted, and certain. In these cases, the Court merely attests to the law's existence. It does not create a new norm. The court is, in the words of Montesquieu, a mouthpiece for the legislators or the constituent authority. However, the law is not known and accepted in all cases. There exist "hard cases" in which the law is uncertain; in such cases, there is more than one legal or constitutional option available. There may be more than one legal interpretation; the rubric in the basic laws provides a number of interpretations; the "Israeli version" of the common law enables a range of solutions or developments-a variety of possibilities which may be deduced from Israel's heritage. In such situations, the declaration of the law by the Supreme Court is also judicial law-making. The law that existed prior to a judicial determination is not the same as that which existed subsequent to it. Before a judicial determination, the statute or basic law spoke with a number of voices. After a judicial determination, the statute or basic law speaks with a single voice. The transition from the uncertainty of multiple possibilities, to the certainty existing in one solution, involves not only a declaration of law, but also creation of law. This is "judicial legislation." In this judicial law-making, the judge has discretion. He is not merely reXecting the existing picture of the law. He also paints the picture with his own hands. Judicial law-making is diVerent from the creation of law undertaken by the constituent assembly or the legislators. They were designated to create laws. The law-making undertaken by them is abstract. In contrast, the judicial branch was not established in order to create laws. It was established in order to decide concrete disputes. Law-making by the judiciary is incidental to the adjudication of disputes. Indeed, the primary function of lawmaking is granted to the legislative and constitution-drafting branches of government. The law-making undertaken by the judicial branch is, by its nature, ancillary to that of the political branches of government. This represents law-making "between the cracks" of the constitution and the legislation.
Judicial law-making is undertaken by every judge within the judicial branch. In creating law, most judges function on the individual level. Their law-making binds the parties to the dispute. When law-making is undertaken by an appellate court-such as the District Court hearing an appeal on a decision from the Magistrate's Court-it constitutes an individual corrective. In contrast, law-making by the Supreme Court-by virtue of the doctrine of stare decisis-functions on the general level. It is binding on the general public and constitutes a general corrective. It is functional lawmaking.
The normative function of judicial law-making is not a reXection of judicial imperialism. It reXects the indeterminacy inherent in the law itself. Law is not mathematics. Law is a normative system that determines what is and is not permitted. By its very nature, it is based upon uncertainty. Indeed, as long as human beings are unable to predict the future, they must be Xexible and allow for solutions to unanticipated problems. As long as language does not enable generalizations that extend to all relevant situations, the existence of situations from which generalizations cannot be derived, which are made by virtue of judicial determination, must be recognized. What is required, then, is the existence of a state organ that has the power to provide solutions to unexpected problems, linked to changing realities. A state organ is required that has the authority to obviate the indeterminacy inherent in the law. Indeed, there is no possibility, and no desire, to build a legal system that contains a pre-existing solution to every known legal problem and presents no uncertainty. Uncertainty derives from human limitations and the characteristics of society. As such, the law is based on the assumption that not all legal problems result in one legitimate solution-that some legal problems contain more than one legitimate solu- tion. The Supreme Court, using its discretion, decides between the legal alternatives.
THE CONSIDERATIONS IN JUDICIAL LAW-MAKING
How is judicial law-making undertaken? What are the standards to be applied? In the absence of binding rules that result in one solution, how do judges create law? Does judicial law-making derive from judicial subjectivity alone? On the basis of my personal experience and my familiarity with the Supreme Court, and in light of the functioning of parallel institutions around the world, it appears that one can point to a number of trends and standards that guide the judicial discretion of a Supreme Court judge. I will mention the three primary standards: Wrst, giving expression to the fundamental values of the system; second, striving to close the gaps between law and life; and, third, protecting the character of the State as a Jewish and democratic state. The fundamental values of the system are reXected in judicial law-making. They are the key to statutory and constitutional inter-pretation. They are the force driving the common law. Israel has a de facto constitution that represents the body of legal norms which comprise the central ruling organs-president, legislature, executive, judiciary-and their authorities and inter-relations. This constitution also includes essential fundamental human rights. Every state in the world has such a de facto constitution. Since its establishment, Israel has had such a constitution.
Israel not only has a de facto constitution, it also has a formal constitution. This is the document or set of documents that anchor, through their requirements, a de facto constitution. There is currently full realization of the existence of a formal constitution in Israel. These are the eleven "basic laws" of Israel (in order of adoption): The judge learns about fundamental values from the basic documents, such as the constitution itself. From our constitution, we learn that the values of the State of Israel are those of a Jewish and democratic state; that the constitution's fundamental rights are founded upon the recognition of human value, and of the sanctity of human life and liberty. From the Declaration of Independence, we learn that Israel was to be founded on fundamentals of liberty, peace, and justice, and was to grant full equality of social and political rights to all of its citizens. The judge also learns about fundamental values from the statutes and the case law; but, above all, he learns about such values from the aggregate national experience and from the nature of government rule, as democratic rule, and from his understanding of the basic concept of the nation. "It is a known axiom," wrote Justice Agranat over forty years ago, "that the law of a nation is learned through the prism of the system of its national life." Indeed, the movement of our nation through history, its religious and social roots, its national revival against the background of the Second World War and the Holocaust are all powerful sources from which the judge extracts the fundamental values of the state and the regime. The democratic nature of our regime, and the social values derived from it-such as the separation of powers, judicial independence, the rule of law-comprise a system of principles and values according to which the judge creates law. Our existence as a state containing a nonJewish minority entitled to full equality reXects our state of being. The fundamental values on which the culture and tradition of this non-Jewish minority is founded constitutes part of our complete national experience. The judge gives expression to these fundamental social concepts of the nation.
The values that direct the judge are the fundamental values. They are not the results of a public opinion survey. They are not populism carrying away the masses. They are not changing styles. They are not sensational newspaper headlines. All of these are important. They may, in the long term, permeate and alter the soul of the nation. However, as long as this does not transpire, these do not amount to standards directing the judge. Thus, when society is not true to itself, the judge is not obligated to give expression to such Xeeting momentary sentiments. He stands opposed to these sentiments, while giving expression to social agreement, reXecting the basic principles, and the fundamental vision of society.
Accordingly, imposed upon the judge is the protection of the human rights of every individual, and, inasmuch as there exists societal sympathy or antipathy toward him, depending upon the sentiments of the moment, he will bear it. Thus, imposed upon the judge is the obligation to protect the collective, and therefore human rights should not be used as an instrument of national destruction. If there is no security for the collective, none exists for the individual; ensuring the political and social framework is a necessary condition for securing human rights themselves.
MUTABILITY AND ENTRENCHMENT AS CONSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS
Is the formal constitution of Israel entrenched? A constitution is entrenched if it contains the supreme norms in the same legal system, and if it is superior to ordinary legislation in such a way that an ordinary statute of the legislator (i.e., the Knesset) is unable to amend or repeal its provisions. A formal constitution is mutable if an ordinary statute put forth by the legislative branch is able to amend or repeal its provisions. Is the formal constitution of Israel entrenched, or mutable?
The current answer is clear and known to every jurist. Our formal constitution, which is comprised of our basic laws, is entrenched. An ordinary statute from our legislative body cannot amend our formal constitution. An ordinary statute may repeal a constitutional provision only if such power is expressly provided in the constitution itself. Thus, the Basic Laws are the supreme legal norms in Israel. Beneath them are the ordinary statutes. A Basic Law and an ordinary law do not stand on the same normative level. They stand on two diVerent normative plains-the Basic Law being the superior norm and the ordinary law inferior to it.
What is the eVect of an inconsistency between an ordinary statute and a Basic Law? Is the ordinary law invalid? Who is qualiWed to adjudicate upon the existence of an inconsistency and the outcome of the invalidation? Is there, in Israel, judicial review of the constitutionality of a statute similar to that which exists in the United States, Canada, Germany, and other democratic nations? The answer to this question is also clear today to every jurist. A statute that is inconsistent with a Basic Law is invalid. In Israel there exists judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes. The Israeli courts-and, at their head, the Supreme Court-are qualiWed to determine that an ordinary law, inconsistent with a Basic Law, is unconstitutional and therefore invalid. I will not explain in detail the historical and legal reasons that brought about this constitutional structure; instead, I will brieXy outline my own position. In the Declaration of Independence, issued on the The Declaration of Independence envisaged, following the United Nations' partition resolution, the enactment of a constitution. It is not disputed that this was to be a formal constitution. The constitution was to be drawn up by the Constituent Assembly, which was to be elected no later than the Wrst day of October 1948. Due to the War of Independence, the election of the Constituent Assembly was postponed. The Constituent Assembly was elected on the 25 th of January 1949 in special elections. At the same time, the provisional administration was dissolved, transferring all of its authority to the Constituent Assembly. The Constituent Assembly, which named itself "The First Knesset," thereby held a dual role. It was the constituent body, and in this role was to establish a formal constitution; and it possessed legislative authority, which was transferred to the Constituent Assembly from the provisional administration. During the life of the Constituent Assembly, as the Wrst Knesset, it engaged in stormy debates over the constitution. Mapai (the Israel Workers' Party) and its leader Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion were opposed to the adoption of a constitution. The opposition party, Herut [Liberty] , and its leader Menachem Begin called for the immediate adoption of a constitution. The initiator of the compromise was Knesset member Yizhar Harrari. The "Harrari Resolution" (13 June 1950) states:
The Wrst Knesset charges the Constitutional, Legislative, and Judicial Committee with the duty of preparing a draft constitution for the State. The constitution shall be composed of individual chapters, in such a manner that each of them shall constitute a basic law in itself. The individual chapters shall be brought before the Knesset as the Committee completes its work, and all the chapters together will form the state constitution.
The Wrst Knesset dissolved without adopting even the Wrst chapter of the constitution. At the same time, it assigned all of its authority, including its authority as the constituent assembly, to the second Knesset and to every Knesset thereafter. Since then, the Knesset has engaged in the enactment of Basic Laws in its capacity as a constituent body. As such, our Knesset wears two crowns or hats: a crown of the constituent body and a crown of the legislative branch. The constituent body crown was conferred upon it from the constituent assembly. It reXects our constitutional history, viewing the Knesset as a competent body to establish a constitution for Israel. It has been doing so, since the Harrari Resolution, through the adoption of Basic Laws. As well as being a constituent body, the Knesset is also a legislative branch. Legislation enacted by the Knesset in its capacity as the legislative authority operates on a lower normative level than constitutional provisions enacted by the Knesset in its capacity as a constituent authority.
What is the source of judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes? This power of review derives from the supremacy of the Basic Laws. The supremacy would cease to exist, in theory and in practice, if an ordinary Knesset statute were able to alter or repeal it. This leads to the inferencea derivative from the normative supremacy of the Basic Laws-that a statute contradicting a Basic Law will not be legally valid. In many nations, it has been expressly provided in their constitutions that a statute inconsistent with the constitution is deemed invalid and that the court is qualiWed to declare it as such. This is the case, for example, in Canada and Germany. However, there are nations that have constitutions that are silent on the issue of judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes. Despite this silence, it is accepted-and the courts' decisions support this-that a statute inconsistent with a constitution is invalid, and that the court is qualiWed to declare it as such. The best-known example of this is the United States. In the United States Constitution, there is no provision pertaining to the outcome of a conXict between a congressional statute and the constitution. There is also no provision relating to the authority of the court to declare a statute invalid. Notwithstanding, the American judicial tradition-since the decision in Marbury vs. Madison in 1803-holds that a statute that violates constitutional provisions is invalid, and every court is qualiWed to declare it as such. In Israel the law was stated in a similar vein.
Thus, in Israel there is now an entrenched formal constitution. An ordinary legislative statute is unable to amend or repeal it. In order to amend a Basic Law, the enactment of another Basic Law is required. An attempt to repeal an arrangement that is anchored in a Basic Law must be based upon permission expressly embedded in the Basic Law itself. There are few of these express arrangements.
At the same time, our constitution is not complete. Not all the chapters of the constitution have been Wnalized. There are matters that must still be incorporated. For example, it is considered important to incorporate human rights that were not expressly mentioned, including: equality, freedom of expression, freedom of scientiWc creativity, and social rights. Those recently of particular importance include the contractual protections granted to property and occupation. There is also an absence of rights of the accused and criminal suspects. But beyond this, although our formal constitution is entrenched, this entrenchment is, at present, very precarious. Most of the Basic Laws may be amended by the enactment of another Basic Law by a regular majority of those Knesset members present. Some of the Basic Laws require a special majority of the Knesset in order to amend or repeal their provisions-either a majority of all members of the Knesset (that is, at least 61 members), or a super-majority of 80 or 90 Knesset members. This situation is considered by many to be unsatisfactory. Thus, for example, the central Basic Law under discussion concerning human rights-Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty-may be amended by the enactment of another Basic Law by a regular majority. DiVerent proposals to change this situation are before the Knesset. Dan Meridor, as Justice Minister, was carrying the Xag for these changes. The incompleteness of our constitution impairs its normative force and its supremacy.
It is now incumbent upon us to recognize, to understand, and to internalize the simple truth: we now have a constitution. We are a constitutional democracy. We are accustomed to saying that our constitution is "en route" because it is being enacted through individual chapters, and that, only in the future, with their amalgamation into one single document, will we have a formal, entrenched constitution. This attitude does not reXect the normative reality. We do not have a "constitution en route"; we are en route of a constitution.
STRIVING TO CLOSE THE GAPS BETWEEN LAW AND LIFE
An inherent and internal tension exists between law and reality; between norms and action; between the "needing" and the "having." The judge is required to reconcile this tension. He must adapt the law to the changing circumstances of life. He must build new structures on the existing foundations. This is one of the primary functions of the judge. At the same time, the judge must preserve security and stability. Accordingly, in utilizing judicial discretion, he must balance the need for change against maintenance of the status quo. The life of the law is in a constant state of transition. The law must be stable, yet it must not stand still. Stability without change is stagnation. Change without stability is anarchy. The Supreme Court must close the gaps between law and life, and it must do so without frustrating reasonable expectations. It must eVect both stability and change. The movement of the judicial process across legal history must be circumspect. It must be evolutionary and not revolutionary. It should be based upon natural development and continuity. It should be manifested in consistency. Indeed, given the choice between truth and stability, truth is preferable; yet between truth and truth, stability is preferable. However, life is in a constant process of change, and with it, so too is law. The history of the law is the history of the adaptability of the law to the changing needs of society. A normative system that does not allow growth results in calciWcation. One cannot ensure stability, certainty, consistency, and continuity without change. Like an eagle in the sky, law can only preserve stability when it is moving. The judge preserves the stability of the law only when he is altering it, by providing solutions to new problems that life creates.
PRESERVING THE JEWISH AND DEMOCRATIC CHARACTER OF THE STATE
In its judicial law-making, the Supreme Court realizes the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic State. The values of Israel as a Jewish state are the values of Israel's heritage and Zionism. Accordingly, a judge must reXect, in the act of balancing, the values of liberty, justice, integrity, and peace of Israel's heritage. He must give expression to the national revival of the Jewish people in its state. Similarly, he must give expression to the values of the State of Israel as a democratic state. The judge must reXect Israel as a state in which non-Jewish citizens live, entitled to full equality, as well as ensuring that the social and cultural values reXecting their traditions will be manifested in the values of the state. The judge must reXect the values of Israel as a constitutional democracy. A constitutional democracy is based upon majority rule. A democracy is based upon agreement as to the rules of the game, even if there is no agreement as to the results of the game. Democracy is not based upon everyone considering that democracy itself is the supreme value. Democracy is based upon diVerent people, each one of them having diVerent supreme values, who agree that democratic rule is the sole means by which to administer life together.
Majority rule is the rule of the people through their representatives. The meaning of majority rule is that political decisions are made through bodies whose power is conferred by the people. The meaning of a democracy is that the power to deal with state matters is placed solely upon acting state authorities according to law. Notwithstanding this, a constitutional democracy is not only concerned with majority rule, but is also concerned with human rights. A regime that is based upon majority rule, yet denies the minority their human rights, is not a democratic regime. A regime that denies the individual his human rights is not a democratic regime, even if such denial is exercised through parliamentary action based upon majority decision. We must diVerentiate between a formal democracy, which is concerned with the decision-making process whereby the majority principle is dominant, and a substantive democracy, which is concerned with the protection of fundamental values and human rights.
Our constitution reXects the profound concepts of Israeli society; it protects both the ruling structures and human rights, and balances the collective good against that of the individual. It is the role of the judge to preserve this structure of constitutional balancing. In solving hard cases, it is appropriate for the judge to utilize his discretion in choosing from multiple linguistic meanings that which realizes the purpose of the legislation. To this purpose, the interpreter stands apart from the drafter, the history, and the fundamental values of the system. In this framework, each one receives interpretative inspiration from Jewish Law. This was expressed by President Landau:
It should not be set in stone as a principle of interpretation that we must Wrst and foremost turn to the sources of Jewish law in order to remove doubt arising in relation to the correct interpretation of Israeli legislation. The idea of requiring the interpreter to turn to this source rather than another for sole inspiration pertains to the sphere of the independent thinking of the interpreter-I see a contradiction in terms between this absolute obligation and that of "Wrst and foremost." I Wnd this approach to be correct as an example and appropriate from the legal policy perspective. What, then, is the interpretative status of Jewish Law in legislative interpretation? The answer is that, inasmuch as the language of the statute is taken from Jewish Law, the linguistic meaning that will be given to the piece of legislation will naturally include the linguistic meaning that is given to the text in Jewish Law. The interpreter is entitled to learn from our sources-historical, legal, and cultural-the meaning an expression can carry in the Hebrew language. Moreover, given that the content of the law is inXuenced by Jewish Law, Jewish Law must be taken into account as part of legislative history. If the Knesset intended to adopt Jewish Law in relation to a particular issue, this intention should be enforced as required by the accepted rules of interpretation according to which the speciWc purpose of the legislation should be realized. But beyond this, the values of Jewish Law constitute part of the values of Israeli Law. The fundamental concept of Jewish Law-the national asset of the Jewish people-is the fundamental concept of Israeli law. These values of Israeli Law, which encompass the values of Jewish Law, constitute part of the general purpose of every piece of legislation. This is how the special status of Jewish Law, our national asset, is manifested, whereby its values are our values. It is here that the important contribution of Justice Elon Wnds expression. In his many opinions, he draws upon the fundamental values of Jewish Law in order to discern the purpose of the legislation according to which it should be interpreted. Hence, we gain an extensive jurisprudence encompassing various legal areas, in which the fundamental values of Jewish Law-balanced with other fundamental values of the state-play an important role in the interpretation of legislation.
I accept the view that Jewish Law has, for us, a special interpretative status that is diVerent from every other legal system. This status does not entail a prioritized interpretative position that must be applied Wrst and foremost; rather, it means that Jewish Law reXects the fundamental principles and values of our culture, whereby part of them comprise the fundamentals of our modern law. Indeed, we are a young state, yet an ancient people. Our roots are embedded in our long years of tradition. The fundamental values of Jewish Law shape our character, both as a people and as a state. This Wnds expression in our being not only a democratic state, but also a Jewish state. As such, the uniqueness of Jewish Law is not in Jewish Law as a system, but in the basic principles underlying Jewish law as a legal culture. These principles-inasmuch as they constitute a part of our modern legal culture-are used in the interpretation of legislation. In determining the purpose of a piece of legislation, the interpreter turns to the basic principles and derives from them the objective purpose of the legislation. In this "derivation," the fundamental values of Jewish Law and its integrity and perception of justice will be manifested.
It is only natural that such perceptions-and not the perceptions of the French, the Italians, or the Americans-reXect the fundamental values of our system. Hence, the application of Jewish Law is not concerned with the application of comparative law; rather, the application of the fundamental values of Jewish Law is the application of the fundamental values of Israeli law. Moreover, the application of Jewish Law is not only permissible, it is obligatory. It should be emphasized, however, that this application is only of those fundamental values of Jewish Law that constitute part of the fundamental values of our law and our system. We are a democratic state in which there are non-Jewish minorities. Only those fundamental values of Jewish Law that are compatible with this character become part of our system, and only they may be taken into account.
Finally, the application is that of fundamental values of Jewish Law and not of concrete legal solutions, although such solutions may point to fundamental values, thereby justifying their study and examination. The application is of values and not of Jewish legal rules [halakhot] , even though one can derive the values from these rules; that is, not a speciWc law in a particular matter, but the values, principles, and spirit of the speciWc law. Hence, it is possible to use Jewish Law as an integral part of our rules of interpretation, within the scope of the linguistic meaning and within the scope of the formulation of the purpose, both speciWc and general, of a piece of legislation. Justice S.Z. Cheshin expressed this eloquently more that forty-Wve years ago.
In every situation in which the Court is required to interpret a legal term in every law that was legislated after the foundation of the state, and that term is also found in the sources or our ancient literature or is borrowed from them, the Court is permitted to turn to those sources in order to clarify its interpretation and to determine the concept that is concealed in it, only if it is clear beyond any doubt from drawing comparisons and parallels that the rules emanating from the law and from the ancient source are similar in relation to the matter under discussion, or that the legal idea embodied in the source is wide enough to include the legal idea that the legislator wishes to express, under the new circumstance, through the use of a term "borrowed" from that source.
Hence, Jewish Law is used as an inspiration for interpretation. It widens the horizon and the interpretative Weld of vision. As such, it provides added depth to the interpretative creation. However, this does not grant it Wrst priority in the interpretative process. This is true with regard to the interpretation of every legal text whose language or content is inXuenced by Jewish Law. Thus, it is also true for the interpretation of provisions carrying value-content, such as "justice," "good faith," "equality"-whether absorbed from Jewish Law, inXuenced by foreign legal systems, or comprising an independent legal creation. In this matter, Justice Elon expressed the view that value-laden terms of a universal character, which are the heritage of every legal and value-based thought, should be interpreted Wrst and foremost in light of the principles of Jewish Law. Indeed, I accept that one should interpret value-based legal provisions against a background of "diVerent value-based norms." Every law has a soul that reXects the funda-mental values of the legal system. Thus, value-laden terms concerning values such as "good faith," "justice," and "reasonableness" should be interpreted against a background of the basic values of state law. In the framework of these basic values, the fundamental values of Jewish Law have a place of honor.
JUDICIAL LEGISLATION AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
The Court creates law. The Court interprets the text of the legislation according to its purpose. Within the scope of this purpose the Court gives expression-along with speciWc aims-to the general values of the state. It creates the "Israeli version" of common law. It does so by giving expression to the basic values of the system. This is a simple task when all of the values lead to one result. In this situation there is no judicial creativity. Sometimes, however, the diVerent values lead in diVerent directions. The task of the judge in such cases is diYcult. A contradiction is created among the diVerent fundamental values, with the values of security and public order leading in one direction and human rights in another. Human rights may conXict with one another: freedom of expression with the reputation of an individual; freedom of movement with property rights. How is this contradiction resolved? The technique the Court has adopted is one of balancing: the judge places upon the scales all of the values and weighs and balances them. Developed in the area of Public Law, public order is balanced against freedom of expression, and a "balancing formula" is created according to which public order is given priority, provided that there is near certainty that granting freedom to an expression will cause real harm to public order. This technique is not unique to Public Law, but is applicable to all legal areas. The entire Weld of Private Law is, in fact, the result of a balancing between constitutional human rights. Of course, the discussion of "weight," "scales," and "balancing" is metaphorical. The values and the considerations are not laid before the judge with a label delineating their weight. "Weight" denotes relative social importance; "scales," a comparison of social values; and, "balancing," a determination of a general measure enabling each value to realize itself, while impairing the other values as little as possible. In the conduct of such delicate balancing, the importance of the judicial role is revealed. Through the realization of this balancing, the professionalism of the judge is attained. Indeed, a professional judge is able to fulWll such a diYcult task in calm periods as well as stormy moments. He will be up to such a task because judging for him is not merely a profession, but a way of life; he will succeed in this role because the fundamental values are the compass directing his way. He will realize this ambition because judicial independence and lack of bias are the backbone of his existence.
The judge deals with "judicial legislation." He creates general legal norms. He does so according to the fundamental principles of the system. There are those who criticize such actions. This criticism is important. One should cope with it. What are the claims, and what is the response to them?
One claim is that legislation is a function of the legislator, who is elected by the people. It is not at all appropriate for the judge to deal with legislation. This claim is certainly true of the institutional sphere. The legislative institution is the Knesset. The Court is not a legislative institution. Its role is not to legislate. Its role is the adjudication of disputes. Is it possible, however, to refrain from legislating in its functional sense; that is from conducting trials? For a thousand years, English Law has been engaging in judicial law-making-"Common Law." Every court in every country engages in law-making by interpreting legislation. Indeed, as long as the law is a human creation, judicial legislation is unavoidable. Judicial legislation exists because life is always richer than the law, and the judge will always face situations that the law did not predict. Judicial legislation exists because the legislator, no matter how professional and competent, is always limited in formulating generalizations that will apply to all relevant circumstances; judicial legislation exists because the use of vague terminology such as "good faith" and "human dignity" is unavoidable. As long as the legislator enacts vague texts-and this is impossible to avoid-judicial legislation in its functional sense will exist. It may be broader or narrower, but it is inevitable. Provided that the legislation of the Knesset is enacted by human beings and that human language is not expressed in mathematical formulas, and the rules of interpretation are not entirely technical, functional judicial legislation is unavoidable.
A second claim is that judicial legislation-a result of judicial discretion-impairs the separation of powers. According to this approach, the role of the judiciary as a branch of government is to adjudicate disputes and not to create law. Its role is to implement the law of the legislator, and not to create law instead of the legislator. The response to this claim is that its criticism is founded on a romantic and baseless notion of separation of powers. It assumes total separation of powers, which does not exist anywhere in the world. A modern concept of separation of powers sits well with judicial law-making. The judge is a junior partner in the legislative enterprise. He is a senior partner in the common law enterprise. In the same way that the executive branch partakes in law-making-and in doing so there is no illegal impairment of the separation of powers-so too the judicial branch partakes in law-making with no impairment of the separation of powers. The creation of law by the judiciary is incidental to the adjudication of a dispute; this law-making, as it pertains to the interpretation of the law, derives from delegation by the legislative branch itself. The legislators, who have created the law, entrusted its interpretation to the judge. There is no possibility of implementing the law without interpreting it. Common law creation is part of our legal tradition. If the legislative body is not satisWed with this, it has the ability to enact considerable legislation, and, by so doing, narrow the sphere of judicial creation within the framework of the Israeli common law. There is no certainty, however, that, by doing so, judicial legislation will decrease. Legislation that resorts to terms such as "reasonable," "appropriate," "appropriate measure," "public policy," and other vague terms reinforces the creation of law by the judge.
A third claim is that the determination of values is a matter for the legislator and not the judge. The judge is not a creator of values. The judge gives expression to values, which develop within the nation and reXect its culture and tradition. Justice Agranat, in the Kol ha'Am case, did not create the value of freedom of expression; Justice Cheshin in the Bejerano case, did not create the value of freedom of occupation. These judges, along with the rest of the Israeli judges, were merely giving expression to the fundamental values of our legal system, embodied in our being a Jewish and democratic state. The law is a normative creation. It determines what is permitted and what is forbidden. It is saturated with values. Law without values is merely a game. One cannot separate law and values: the law reXects values and is based upon them. A judge who is a creator and an interpreter of law must be concerned with values.
The fourth claim against judicial law-making is based on democracy. Is it appropriate that a judge who is neither elected nor accountable to the electors should determine the appropriate balancing of values? Is this action contrary to democracy? The response is simple. If the meaning of democracy refers solely to majority rule, then judicial creativity is undemocratic. According to what we have seen, however, democracy is not only about majority rule. The perception of democracy solely as majority rule is a onesided concept of democracy. Democracy is also the regime of fundamental values and, at their center, human rights. In this multi-dimensional vision, judicial creativity does not impair democracy. In this comprehensive vision, judicial creativity advances and preserves democracy. The fact that the judge is distinct from politics and does not stand for re-election every four years grants him independence and enables him to give expression to the funda-mental concepts of society and to individual human rights, even if these concepts are not acceptable to the present majority.
A Wfth claim is directed against judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes and against the power of a court to declare a law invalid that is contrary to the constitution-in Israel, the Basic Laws. Does this judicial review sit well with democracy? The answer is that such judicial review is compatible with democracy and constitutes an integral part thereof. Indeed, according to what we have seen, democracy is not only majority rule; it is also the regime of fundamental values and human rights that are crystallized in the constitution. Democracy is a delicate balance between majority rule and the fundamental values of society governed by the majority. It is not only formal democracy, concerned with the election process by which the majority govern, but also substantive democracy, concerned with the protection of human rights and individual human rights. Indeed, when the majority deprives the minority of their human rights, democracy is impaired. When judges interpret constitutional provisions and invalidate laws contravening these provisions, they are giving expression to the fundamental values of society, as crystallized throughout the history of the society. In so doing, they preserve constitutional democracy and maintain the delicate balance upon which it is based. Removing the regime of fundamental values from a constitutional democracy substantially impairs its existence. Judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes enables society to be sincere with itself and to respect its basic concepts. This is the basis of the essential legitimacy of judicial review. This is also the true basis of the constitutional principle itself. We are subject to a constitution which was established in the past, because it reXects the profound concepts of modern society.
In this sense, it is possible to say that each generation re-establishes the constitution. Indeed, through judicial review, we are true to the fundamental values that we placed upon ourselves in the past, that are reXected by us in the present, and that will guide us in our national development as a society in the future. It is no wonder, then, that judicial review evolved recently. Most democratic nations have judicial review. Today, it is hard to imagine the United States, Canada, Germany, Japan, Spain, Italy, South Africa, and many other nations without judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes. The twentieth century is the century of judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes. This provides substantive meaning to the principle of constitutionality, constitutional democracy, and the appropriate balancing between majority rule and human rights, between the individual and the whole.
It is possible to say that the claim of an absence of democracy in judicial review also maintains an absence of democracy in the protection of human rights. Indeed, the democratic character of a state is not determined according to the character of the representatives of each one of its branches, but rather according to the democratic character of the entire regime. In judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes, the court realizes the constitution and, as a consequence, realizes, in a constitutional democracy, democracy itself. The constitution-and, in Israel, the Basic Laws-expresses the will of the nation. It is the pinnacle of democracy, and its realization is the supreme stage in the realization of democracy. Judicial review gives expression to the democratic principles underlying the constitution. It gives expression to the will of the nation through the creation of a constitution as a supreme and supra-legal norm. It is true that this will interferes with the will of the present majority. Judicial review does not stand opposed to this will. Judicial review merely gives expression to another will, "deeper" and "of greater importance." Thus, the conXict for the judge to decide is not one between the will of the judge and the will of the nation as expressed in the law. The conXict for the judge is one between the will of the nation-a timeless will continuing over the long term, as expressed in the constitution-and a temporary will of the nation, as expressed in the law. Of course, it is possible to say that it is appropriate for the present will to be decisive. This assertion goes against the actual existence of a constitution. However, if it is accepted that the existence of a constitution is a constitutional givenas in Israel-and if it is accepted that the constitution will be granted supremacy-as in Israel-not only is judicial review not undemocratic, it is a clear expression of the will of the nation as expressed in the constitution.
Of course, there may be a change in the concept of the nation itself. Values that in the past were considered important may lose their importance. There always exists the possibility of altering the constitution through additions and subtractions. The constitution itself provides means of amendment. The present majority Wnds expression through the means of amending the constitution. As long as the constitution has not been amended, however, judicial review constitutes the primary tool for the protection of the constitution and democracy itself. Judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes provides the central means for preserving the democratic character of the state.
An additional claim is that law-making by a judge is sometimes a consequence of judicial discretion; that, in the absence of rules, it derives from the subjectivity of every judge; and, that this concept is not desirable and should be minimized. The response to this claim is complex. Indeed, judicial creativity, meaning judicial discretion, assumes the absence of deliberate legal rules. From this perspective, it indeed results in judicial subjectivity. Together with this, several points are worth noting. First, judicial discretion is exercised in only a small number of cases. In most disputes brought before the judge, there is no judicial creativity, nor is there judicial legislation. The judge is the mouthpiece of the legislator. Judicial legislation thus occurs in very few cases. Second, even when judicial discretion is exercised, it is not absolute. Judicial discretion is invariably limited; a judge is not free to do as he pleases. Third, in exercising his judicial discretion, the judge realizes the fundamental values of the system, even if such values are not shared by him. It is not the subjective world view of the judge that serves him; rather it is the values of his system. The judge acts in an objective manner in the sense that he acts on the basis of values external to himself. These values are based on the social agreement underlying the legal system. Indeed, in a democratic state, the judge gives expression to the profound perceptions of society and not to his personal opinions. The judge should reXect societal views even if he does not share those views. The judge gives expression to constitutional values according to the signiWcance conferred upon them by the culture and tradition of the nation as it moves through history. He reXects the fundamental perceptions of the nation and its national ethos and not his personal perceptions.
Thus, it cannot be denied that there is rarely a subjective dimension to judicial law-making. Only particularly hard cases, where all of the objective considerations are balanced, require a subjective determination. Is there not another possibility, however? Would we want to abandon the central role of the court in a democratic society because of the existence of judicial subjectivity in the most diYcult cases, which are few in number? Is it not renouncing the sovereignty of the constitution-a constitution that may be amended if the judicial determination is not appropriate-solely because of fear of judicial subjectivity? Even if we could totally abandon judicial subjectivity, would we want to? The existence of judicial subjectivity, as a given, is unavoidable in a few diYcult cases and requires the judge to take particular care. The judge must make every eVort to exercise judicial objectivity. The judge must reXect the long-term beliefs of society and avoid imposing his individual beliefs. This requirement of objectivity places a heavy burden upon the judge. He must create a clear delineation between his views as an individual and his views as a judge. He must be able to diVerentiate between personal views and those of society-to be able to recognize the possibility that his personal opinions may not be those of the public majority. He must diVerentiate between his personal world view and the ethos of the nation.
He must be self-critical and exercise humility toward his status. He must respect the chain connecting him as a judge.
Therefore, the judge gives expression to the values of the constitution as they have been understood by the culture and the tradition of the nation throughout history. By reXecting the fundamental concepts of the nation and the national ethos, and not his personal views, the judge realizes democracy and the constitution. This is the main justiWcation for our constitutional structure, which grants the Supreme Court the power to declare a law invalid that contravenes our constitution. In doing this, the judge does not give expression to his subjective views. By invalidating a law, the judge gives expression to those profound values of society that it wants to safeguardperhaps also from the power of the majority itself.
Judicial objectivity underlies judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes. Only a professional judge who has absorbed, over many years, the need to ensure judicial objectivity, and who enjoys complete independence, can fulWll this onerous task. The education of the professional judge, his experience, and the legal culture which he inhabits internalize the values of independence, objectivity, and the ability to diVerentiate between personal views and requirements of the job. There is no one as aware of the limitations placed upon him in a democratic society as the professional judge. Only a judge who perceives judging not merely as a job, but as a way of life, is able fulWll this task. Only a judge whose entire education provides him with the ability to think in the abstract, based upon reason rather than power, and the weight of the claim rather than the right of the claimant, is able to fulWll this task. Only a judge who lives with the daily tension between the abstract principle and its actualization in real life litigants standing before him is able to withstand this diYcult task. For the sake of all of the above, a judicial branch is necessary that is independent, emanates from the people, reXects the basic social consensus, and yet is not elected every few years as are members of Knesset.
THE SUPREME COURT IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY
The primary role of the Supreme Court in a democratic society-as is that of every court-is the arbiter of disputes. The objective in the adjudication of a dispute, when undertaken by the Supreme Court, is not merely to solve the individual problems of the parties to the dispute. The objective is also to declare and create the law according to which the dispute will be decided. In this creation of law, the court sees itself as an organ of the constitutional democracy designated to safeguard the constitutional democracy and its values; in a democratic society, the role of the court is to interpret the constitution and statutes and to create common law in a way that achieves the appropriate balance between the requirements of the individual and the whole, and between the rights of the individual and among those rights themselves; between public order and public security, and the rights of the individual and his liberty; between the values of the state as a Jewish state, and the values of the state as a democratic state. The Court does this not according to the subjective values of the judge, but according to the objective values of society. The judge has neither a sword nor a purse. All he has is independence. The daily bread of the judge is the Basic Laws. He balances them in an objective manner. He does not seek power. He does not desire to rule. He does not wish to impose his views on society. He wishes only to do justice within the legal framework and to make law that is just.
Since the establishment of the State of Israel, the Supreme Court has stood-with all Israeli society-as a fortress of Israeli democracy. The Supreme Court is the protector of democracy. This role was validated with the enactment of the Basic Laws concerning human rights. Additional protective walls have been built around human rights. The Court is entrusted with their safeguarding, and was designated the constitutional role of preserving fundamental concepts and values of the Israeli society in accordance with the Basic Laws. The Court is required to balance the fundamental principles of Israeli society as expressed in the Basic Laws, and the short-term, day-today needs as expressed in ordinary legislation. Moreover, the Court is entrusted with the task of uncovering the basic values and fundamental principles, while rejecting those that are transitory or Xeeting. In order to do this, the judge must enjoy public trust. This does not mean public agreement with his decisions; rather, it is faith in the purity of those decisions and belief that the judge is not party to power struggles, and that he is not struggling to advance his own power, but that he always Wghts for that of the rule of law. Public trust does not mean an absence of criticism. On the contrary, criticism is important to every authoritative body. It is vital for a judiciary, which may not only make mistakes, but is sometimes even wrong. However, criticism should be pertinent-it should be based upon an understanding of the complexity of the role and not upon ill-founded beliefs that have nothing to do with the actual functioning of the Supreme Court. One must bear in mind that public trust is a fragile asset. It should be nurtured and preserved.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court is a complex institution. It is not only an appellate court. It engages, by way of speciWc cases, in general law-making. It engages in judicial legislation. In so doing, the Court advances the rule of law and the separation of powers-it realizes democracy in its deepest sense. At the same time, judicial creativity requires great care and considerable judicial restraint. Whoever ensures that others do not overstep their authority must take great care not to overstep its own authority. The Court must be sensitive to fundamental values and human rights, while maintaining the ability to diVerentiate between the subjective and the objective. It must insist upon the basic principles and struggle against Xeeting momentary sentiments. When a judge creates law, he himself stands on trial. He must recognize the people and their problems. Although judges exist in an ivory tower, that tower is based on the hills of Jerusalem, not on Mount Olympus. The judge must move with the history of the people. It is a diYcult role. It does not involve domination, but, rather, servitude. NOTE *This article is a slightly revised version of a speech delivered at the opening ceremony of the academic year, Netanya College of Law, 21 November 1997.
